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Abstract
The task of this paper is to show how philosophy can mediate
in the conflict of religious traditions, using the insights of Jürgen
Habermas in his acceptance speech on the occasion of the award of
the Karl Jaspers Prize of the Town and University of Heidelberg on
26 September 1994, “The Conflict of Beliefs, Karl Jaspers on the
Clash of Cultures.”  Habermas may not have addressed the problem
directly, but his insights provide meaningful hints in the conduct of
inter-faith dialogues of religious communities.
One of the negative impacts of globalization is the homogenization
of cultures, sometimes referred to as “McDonalization” or “Cocalization,”
that has resulted in the dismantling of social diversity and pluralism of
cultures.  The standardization of life styles by the domination of a centralized
culture identified with the West undermines a culture’s self-reliance and
identity and attacks the traditional religious values that hold the community
together.  Religion occupies a central position in one’s culture, for in spite
of the cultural transformations brought about by greater mobility and the
mass media, it is still religion that gives a distinct identity to a culture.  But
while globalization has given rise to multi-religious cities, has increased the
knowledge of each other’s religious traditions and the levels of interaction
between peoples of different religious traditions, “the same global processes
that draw communities together have also been experienced as a threat to
the specificity and identity of religious communities.”1  Consequently, there
is a new resurgence of religious traditions, reasserting themselves in groups,
“polarizing peoples, creating enemy images, and using religious identity as
one of the powerful forces to mobilize faith communities against each other.”2
The many religious conflicts in many parts of the world (the Middle East,
Sudan, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, India, the former Yugoslavia, Northern Ireland,
and the Philippines) attest to this resurgence, the extreme form of which is
fundamentalism.  Thus arises the urgent need for inter-religious dialogue
not only between individual representatives of different religions but also
between communities themselves.3  A re-emergence of religion into public
life and discourse is necessarily happening today.
The Problematic
There is something unique and at the same time universal in religious
traditions.  The uniqueness comes from the inner cohesive vision of reality
peculiar to the place of origin or to the prophetic figure who taught and
gathered disciples, from the specificity in the expression of this vision as
“enveloped in the philosophical, cultural, linguistic and geo-political realities
of the place of its origin,” eventually finding articulation as systems of beliefs,
rituals, and culture.4  The universality, on the other hand, is explicit or
implicit in the validity claims of the faith-experience of each religious tradition,
that these are for all people, and therefore the message must be spread to
the four corners of the earth.  “Universality of religious traditions can also
be argued on the basis that most of them emphasize common human values
like love, compassion, justice and peace, even though diversities would
emerge if one were to interpret these concepts in concrete situations.”5
Thus Christianity proclaims that Jesus is the Son of God while Islam
considers Jesus as only a prophet, and Buddhism teaches the path to
Nirvana, which is not God but perhaps godhead.  And yet all three religions
preach the values of love and justice.
Habermas states the problem in this way: “Can those who belong
to different cultures meet on a common basis of understanding, and where
might this universal, all embracing commonality be found?”6  In the words
of Karl Jaspers, which Habermas quotes in the opening of his lecture,
Today we are in search of the basis on which human beings from
all the various religious traditions could encounter each other in a
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meaningful way across the entire world, ready to re-appropriate,
purify and transform their own historical traditions, but not to
abandon them.  Such common ground for the (plurality of) faiths
could only be clarity of thought, truthfulness and a shared basic
knowledge.  Only these (three elements) would permit that
boundless communication in which the wellsprings of faith could
draw each other closer, by virtue of their essential commitment.7
Karl Jaspers’ Answer
Before discussing Karl Jaspers’ response to the problem of the
conflict of beliefs, Habermas outlines the different current philosophical
answers that can be briefly summarized as follows:
1. Universalism of the Western tradition that emphasizes the
unity of reason innate in every human being and criticizes the religious
truths using the current standards of science or philosophy.
2. Relativism “which assumes that all strong traditions have their
own incommensurable criteria of the true and the false, criteria which are
internal to them.”8  Both 1 and 2 do away with the problem of intercultural
understanding.
3. Contextualism, also skeptical of universal human reason,
holds that unconditional validity claims “are so deeply immersed in the
context of a specific tradition that the criteria of truth and falsehood are
inseparably woven with a concrete understanding of self and world.”9
Alasdair MacIntyre and Richard Rorty fall in this conception of philosophy
even as they want to avoid the paradoxical standpoint of relativism that
has to exempt its own statement from the context-dependency of other
statements.
4. Philosophical Hermeneutics, against the assimilationist model,
uses the dialogical model of understanding but with a relational symmetry
of the dialogical situation.  “Through the exchange of first-and-second
person perspectives…they are able to effect a rapprochement between
the divergent horizons of their linguistic pre-understanding.  Thus
hermeneutics wrests the universalistic potential of a linguistically embodied
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reason from the conditions of successful communication as such, and
encourages us in the quest for intercultural understanding.”10
But here in Philosophical Hermeneutics, Habermas asks, towards
what is the quest for intercultural understanding?  Towards a substantive
agreement or simply a modest “mutual respect for the sincerely attested
power of opposed traditions?’11  The answer will depend on how we
view the process of Enlightenment occurring in the modern period, on
how we understand the triple relation of philosophy:
1. to its own history, whether as a continuum, leveling out the
transition from tradition to modernity, by construction as in Hegel, or
deconstruction as in Heidegger, or as a break between tradition and
modernity, criticizing metaphysics and transferring inherited from problems
to the realm of belief,
2. to the biblical tradition, in one of the three ways: a) in service
of religion, b) independent of religion, or c) as superior cognitively to
religion; and
3. to other religions, where “Western philosophy was very rarely
sympathetic or even generous.  In this respect Jaspers represents an
interesting exception.”12
In the first place, Jaspers considered Buddha, Confucius and Jesus
as great philosophers.  For him, “they broke the spell of mythical thought
with their words and deeds, and triggered the process of disenchantment
which has continued right up until the modern period.”13  The process of
disenchantment continues in the Enlightenment by freeing us from the
dogmatism of faith based on inherited authority and communicated in
ciphers.  Postmetaphysical thinking in prohibiting images treats the
metaphysical and religious doctrines “as so many encodings of fundamental
experiences which are inaccessible to conceptual explanation.”14  But this
philosophical translation of symbolic meanings runs the risk of forfeiting
the enciphered truth-contents of the religious tradition, while the modern
sciences reduce the lifeworld simply to the domain of what is objectively
knowable and technically controllable.  The result is that ciphers are no
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longer taken seriously and understood as the language of transcendence,
“so that they no longer illuminate the space of existence.”15
The task of philosophy then for Jaspers is to “disclose and preserve
the truth-content concealed in the semantic potentials of traditions shattered
by enlightenment.”16  “By contrast with the sciences, philosophy moves in
the space of essential—in other words: existential-experiences, a space
occupied and structured by faith.  But, in contrast to tradition, it retrieves
these experiences with the argumentative tools of postmetaphysical
thinking.”17  Philosophy must restrict itself to being a philosophy of existence
without resorting to a belief in revelation, as in the case of Kierkegaard.
As a philosophy of existence, it must have an ethics after metaphysics,
without the support of comprehensive interpretation of the world.
“Fundamental philosophical knowledge establishes the conceptual
framework for a possible ethical-existential self-understanding.”18  Yet,
this self-understanding is not achievable without a clear understanding of
‘transcendence,’ “Jaspers’ name for that which always sustains and
encompasses us.”19  Habermas equates Jaspers’ ‘transcendence’ with his
own notion of the ‘linguistically structured life-world.”  And rightly so,
because Jaspers, in contrast to Heidegger, emphasizes the intersubjective
character of authentic self-becoming: “Being a self and being in
communication are inseparable.”20  This communication is not a clinical
discussion with a therapist but an ethical-existential conversation, where
participants engage in a friendly argumentation of competing life projects.
“In our encounter with the existence of others we get clearer about the
faith from which our own existence draws its strength. Thus existential
communication takes the form of a struggle of beliefs.  What is disputed is
how to read the ciphers of these beliefs, and how to release their semantic
potential through the right conduct of life.”21  Fundamental philosophical
knowledge takes the form of a substantive ethic: the sincerity of self-
conscious conduct of life is the ethical criterion to assess the existential
viability of a form of belief. And “to understand each other through ciphers
implies a form of communication in contact with the transcendent.”22  Thus
the participants in the communicative dispute are guided by the “hope for
unanimity,” “a form of agreement which is not to be found at the level of
prepositional content but at the way in which these contents are made
manifest in one’s conduct of life.23
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In the end Jaspers takes this fundamental philosophical knowledge
as ‘faith,’ ‘philosophic faith.’  Habermas interprets this as coming from the
perspective of a specific tradition, that of the Reformation.  And as such,
“it can only appear in plural forms, and can no more claim universal validity
than the metaphysical religious doctrines whose truth content it seeks to
save…[it] remains dependent on communication between human beings,
who are obliged to talk to each other, but not necessarily to pray with
each other.”24 Ibid., p. 40.
Habermas’s Critique of Jaspers
Habermas finds difficulty in Jaspers’ conception of philosophic
faith because of the interpretative role philosophy must also take on.  “For
if fundamental philosophical knowledge is distinguished from the
comprehensive doctrines of the tradition only by virtue of its undogmatic
posture, then it lacks the impartiality which is needed if it is to establish the
rational basis on which contrary faiths can enter into fruitful communication
with each other.”25  Jaspers confuses the two tasks he himself assigns to
philosophy: as an ethical project, his philosophy “is an advertisement for
one form of faith amongst others,” and as an analysis for the conditions
of a successful communication between essentially competing faiths,
“its arguments must be directed towards an agreement concerning the
rules of the game.”26  Habermas finds a similarity of this tension in the
‘political liberalism’ of John Rawls, where philosophy plays a double role:
as a metaphysical doctrine, it raises strong context-dependent truth claims
that cannot be universalized in view of other competing worldviews, and
as theory of justice, it hopes for an acceptance that may be “based on a
fortunate convergence of non-public reasons,” and waits “to find out
whether its proposal is sufficiently neutral to find access to all the competing
world views.”27    Unlike Jaspers, however, Rawls extends the scope of
reason to the conditions of a just political life and not just to a mutual
acknowledgement of divergent conceptions of a fulfilled life.  For Habermas,
“intercultural understanding must be considered from both angles—from
the angle of the good, as well as from that of justice,”28 or what he would
term in another context as the “ethical” and the “moral” respectively.  The
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moral use of practical reason inquires into what is equally good for everyone,
while the ethical into what is respectively good for me or for us.  The
moral pertains to the questions of justice or what all could will, whereas
the ethical can be rationally clarified only in the context of a specific life-
history or a particular form of life.29
For Habermas, if we interpret Jaspers’ philosophical faith as an
expectation “that, after the Enlightenment, strong traditions will abandon
their dogmatic claims to truth and that, instructed by insight into the
fundamental situation of human beings, they will transform themselves into
versions of philosophical faith,” this will mean the death of religions.30
Even as the enlightened philosopher sees the members of other religions
as members of different communities of interpretation, each united around
its own conception of the good life (ethical), the religious person would
insists on the redemptive significance and binding character of prophetically
disclosed truths that are essential to his life.31
Habermas’s Conception of Philosophy
In criticizing Jaspers, Habermas comes up with his own response
to the problem: “only an impartial fundamental knowledge could foster the
desired communication between different forms of belief.”32  Here,
philosophy as fundamental knowledge takes the task of disclosing to
religious and metaphysical worldviews their own inherent reflexivity.
Philosophy “elucidates the difference between religion before and after
the Enlightenment.  It teaches other traditions about that distancing step
away from themselves which reason requires them to take as soon as they
become aware that they share the same universe of validity-claims with
other faiths.”33
But even before such communication can take place, certain
preconditions must already be agreed upon:  First, parties must renounce
the use of violent imposition of their convictions (militaristic, governmental
or terroristic).  Second, they must recognize each other as partners with
equal rights and third, be willing to learn from each other.  These
preconditions, an overcoming of fundamentalistic self-understanding, “imply
not only the reflexive tempering of dogmatic truth-claims, in other words a
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cognitive self-limitation, but also the transition to a different stage of moral
consciousness.”34  In this stage of moral consciousness, Jaspers’ ‘will to
communication’ is driven by the moral insight “that intercultural
understanding can only succeed under conditions of symmetrically
conceded freedoms, a reciprocal willingness to view things from the
perspective of the other.”35
Given such preconditions, can communicative reason expect
unanimity beyond Jaspers’ meaning of mutual respect for each other’s
authentic form of life?  For Habermas, one should not expect a consensus
in controversial existential questions, in questions of ethical self-
understanding.  “The pluralism of world views means that comprehensive
doctrines, whether across the globe or within the same political community,
come into conflict concerning the truth of their declarations, the rightness
of their commandments, and the credibility of their promises.”36  Reflexivity
does not mean an abandonment of essential truth-claims, or a
reinterpretation of truth-claims as context-dependent claims to
authenticity.37  In another context, Habermas speaks of this reflexivity as
the ‘modernization of faith,’ since in our societies today, religious doctrine
has “to accommodate itself to the unavoidable competition with other
forms of faith, and other claims to truth.”38  Only through self-criticism can
a religious tradition “stabilize the inclusive attitude that it assumes within a
universe of discourse delimited by secular knowledge and shared with
other religions.”39  Again, “this decentered background consciousness of
the relativity of one’s standpoint certainly does not lead to the relativization
of articles of faith themselves.”40
From the point of view of the religious tradition, the modernization
of faith is necessary for the preservation and transmission of tradition.
Religious tradition must be rationally justified for it to be re-legitimized.
“The tradition of modernity is the critique of tradition for the sake of
tradition.”41
This modernization of faith has important political consequences:
the community of the faithful must refrain from the use of violence, especially
state-sponsored violence, in promoting its religious belief.  It is “an important
cognitive presupposition for the achievement of religious tolerance and
the construction of a neutral state power.”42
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Needless to say, this reflexivity must also be applied to the West
with its ‘unholy trinity of colonialism, Christianity and Eurocentrism.”43
“Thus the West, molded by the Judaeo-Christian tradition, must reflect on
one of its greatest cultural achievements: the capacity for decentering one’s
own perspectives, self-reflection, and a self-critical distancing of one’s
own traditions.  The West must abstain from any non-discursive means,
must be only one voice among many, in the hermeneutical conversation
between cultures.”44
Conclusion
What then is the mediating role of philosophy in the conflict of
religious traditions?  It is the task as philosophy of reflection in the sense of
reflexion.  It is to engage in argumentative discourse, a more specialized
form of communication, where validity claims previously implicit in religious
symbolic language is made expressly thematized and reinserted back into
the everyday praxis constituted in the lifeworld.45  Philosophy “seeks to
re-express what it learns from religion in a discourse that is independent of
revealed truth….The ambition of philosophy’s ‘translation program’ is, if
you like, to rescue the profane significance of interpersonal and existential
experiences that have so far only been adequately articulated in religious
language.  In contemporary terms, I would like to think of responses to
extreme situations of helplessness, loss of self, or the threat of annihilation,
which leads us speechless.’46
Does this mean that philosophy as the modernization of faith or
the linguistification of the sacred will replace religion?  Not quite, “for
indispensable potentials for meaning are preserved in religious language,
potentials that philosophy has not yet fully exhausted, has not yet translated
into the language of the public, that is of presumptively generally convincing
reasons.47  Religious traditions, especially monotheistic traditions, “have
at their disposal a language whose semantic potential is not yet exhausted,
that shows itself to be superior in its power to disclose the world and to
form identity, in its capability for renewal, its differentiation, and its range.”48
And for “as long as religious language bears with itself inspiring, indeed,
unrelinquishable semantic contents which elude (for the moment?) the
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expressive power of a philosophical language and still await translation
into a discourse that gives reasons for its positions, philosophy, even in its
postmetaphysical form, will neither be able to replace nor to repress
religion.”49  Philosophy and religion need each other, for “in Habermas’s
view, religion without philosophy is speechless, philosophy without religion
is contentless; both remain irreducible as long as we must face our
anthropological vulnerability without consolation, without ultimate
guarantees.”50
Philosophy enables the religious traditions in inter-religious
dialogues to stand in their own individualities, and it is only in their own
stubborn but rationalized individuality that religious traditions can make a
positive contribution to a world culture of globalization.
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